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Abstract. McLachlan and Swales dispute my arguments against commercial surrogate
motherhood. In reply, I argue that commercial surrogate contracts objectionably commodify
children because they regard parental rights over children not as trusts, to be allocated in the
best interests of the child, but as like property rights, to be allocated at the will of the parents.
They also express disrespect for mothers, by compromising their inalienable right to act in the
best interest of their children, when this interest calls for mothers to assert a custody right in
their children.
Key words: commodifiication, Commercial Surrogate Motherhood, surrogacy, Brazier
Report, medical ethics
In “Babies, Child Bearers, and Commodification,” McLachlan and Swales
(2000 this issue) reject my critique of commercial surrogate motherhood,
or contract pregnancy. They correctly argue that contract pregnancy does
not amount to a complete commodification of children or their mothers,
and that some ways people treat commodities (e.g., cherishing them) are
not objectionable ways of treating people. Thus, a sound ethical critique
of contract pregnancy cannot rest on the claim that this practice is exactly
the same as turning children and their mothers into literal commodities, nor
can it rest on just any parallel between the ways contract pregnancy treats
children and their mothers and the ways some people treat some commodities.
Instead, commodification objections to contract pregnancy must (1) precisely
specify the respects in which this practice treats children and their mothers as
commodities, and (2) explain why such treatment is objectionable.
A practice treats something as a commodity if its production, distribution,
or enjoyment is governed by one or more norms distinctive to the market.
Market norms structure relations among the people who produce, distribute,
and enjoy the thing in question. For example, in market transactions the will
and desire of the parties determines the allocation between them of their
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freely alienable rights. Each party is expected to look after her own interests,
neither party is expected to look after the interests of the other, or of third
parties, except to the minimal extent required by law. The question at stake
in contract pregnancy is whether norms like this, governing the sphere of
market transactions, should be extended to cover the allocation of parental
and custodial rights to children.
Contract Pregnancy Commodifies Children
Because they agree with me that the nature of children demands that they
not be sold, McLachlan and Swales go to great lengths to deny that contract
pregnancy amounts to the literal sale of parental and custodial rights over
children. They argue that from a legal point of view, the mother is paid not
to transfer her parental and custodial rights over the child to the father, but
merely to “relinquish her right to claim legal parenthood of the child, and
to relinquish her [de facto] custody.” Because her right is not transferred but
relinquished, the pregnancy contract does not literally involve a legal sale of
parental rights.
Commodification is an ethical and cultural concept, not a legal one. Even
if the pregnancy contract does not involve a transaction that is legally defined
as a sale, it may still commodify children if it replaces parental norms with
regard to rights and custody of children with market norms. I argue that the
pregnancy contract does this, because it moves away from regarding parental
rights over children as trusts, to be allocated in the best interests of the child,
toward regarding parental rights as like freely alienable property rights, to be
allocated at the will of the parents.
To see how this is so, compare two legal regimes: (1) that in which
pregnancy contracts are null and void; (2) that in which pregnancy contracts
are valid and enforceable. I advocate the first regime, McLachlan and Swales
the second. What happens when the mother and father who have signed a
pregnancy contract disagree about who should have custody of the child, once
it is born? Under the first regime, this is treated as a custody dispute between
unmarried parents.1 In the U.S., such disputes are resolved by considering
the best interests of the child. The soundness of one parent’s claim to custody
is always established relative to the other parent, taking the best interests of
the child as the sole standard of judgment. One parent is not allowed to pay
another parent to go away, and expect such a voluntarily contracted agreement
to be upheld by the courts, because parents do not have the right to alienate
their rights over their children at will. Their rights over their children are held
as trusts. Parents have rights over their children because such rights are a
necessary means to discharge their obligations to their children. Since parents
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can’t bargain away their obligations to their children, they can’t bargain away
the necessary means to discharging their obligations, either. It is thechild’s
right to claim care and protection from both of its parents. This right is not
either parent’s to voluntarily relinquish.
Contrast this situation with a legal regime in which the relinquishment
clause of a pregnancy contract is enforced. This would amount to the court
denying the mother legal standing to bring a claim that the child would be
better off in her custody, in virtue of the fact that the other parent acquired
a right in the pregnancy contract to keep her out of any custody dispute.
This is the only thing it could mean torelinquishone’s “right to claim legal
parenthood of the child.”
If this isn’t literally selling a child, it is selling the child out. To enforce
pregnancy contracts is to legally endorse the principle that mothers are
entitled to profit economically from relinquishing their parental rights to the
child, and that others are entitled to induce her to do so. This is to treat her
parental rights as hers to give away, out of regard for her own interests (or, if
“altruism” was her motive, out of regard for the interests of the other parent).
In treating them as freely alienable, the pregnancy contract endorses a way
of regarding these rights not as to be exercised out of love for the child,
but as to be exercised out of regard for the interests of the adults who have
them. Moreover, it introduces a conflict of interest between the mother and
her child: she risks losing her fee if she acts on her judgment that the child
would be better off remaining with her.2 Contrary to McLachlan and Swales’
assertion, this is to exclude a norm of parental love for children – namely, the
norm that the mother may express her love for her child by asserting her right
and duty to care for it as its parent.
Another way to see how children are commodified in the process is to
see how the status of the child differs in the two legal regimes. Where the
pregnancy contract is null and void, the child is the preeminent party in
the custody dispute, whose interests govern the allocation of parental and
custodial rights. Where the pregnancy contract is valid, the child is not a
party to the suit over breach of contract. It is merely the object over which
possession is disputed. If the pregnancy contract is enforceable, then custody
of the child is awarded according to its terms, without an independent inquiry
into the child’s best interests.
McLachlan and Swales want us to believe that the child’s interests are
protected just as well in a legal regime that automatically awards custody
to one parent and terminates the other’s parental rights according to a prior
contractual agreement between the parents (regardless of who would now
be the best parent), as in a legal regime that decides custodial and parental
rights by comparing the case of each parent to be better able to promote the
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best interests of the child. Or do they? Putting it this starkly, their position
is implausible, although it is logically entailed by the view that pregnancy
contracts should be held valid and enforceable.
No wonder McLachlan and Swales waver. They don’t want to be thought
of as advocating a brutal scene, in which a baby is “dragged from [its
mother’s] breast by burly policemen.” They hold out the “risk” that the
commissioning parents might not win custody of the child. “Contracts can be
broken,” they say. On what grounds? They don’t say. Suppose they take the
reasonable view that a sufficient ground to break the contract is that it would
be in the child’s best interests to remain with its mother. How is this ground to
be submitted to the court, if the commissioning father has an enforceable right
to keep the mother from asserting her parental rights, because she accepted
his payment to relinquish those rights? If this ground is to be heard, then the
mother must retain the “claim to assert her parental rights” in court.But this
is to say that she must never be regarded as having relinquished this claim
in the pregnancy contract, which is to say that this clause of the contract
must be regarded as null and void. McLachlan and Swales are caught in a
contradiction: either the child has no right to have its best interests determine
the outcome whenever custodial and parental rights are terminated, or else
the pregnancy contract is null and void. They can’t have it both ways.3
Contract Pregnancy Commodifies Women
Let us now turn to the commodification of the mother’s reproductive labor.
McLachlan and Swales make two main arguments against my view that
pregnancy contracts objectionably reduce women’s reproductive labor to a
commodity. First, there is nothing inherent in treating a woman as an incu-
bator for a child that precludes also treating her with respect. Therefore, if
a given mother is disrespectfully treated by the other parties to a pregnancy
contract, this is a problem with the particular people who treat her that way,
not a problem inherent in the surrogacy arrangement. Second, contracts are,
in general, vehicles for expressing the autonomy and personal perspective of
the parties to it. Pregnancy contracts are no different from any contract in
opening up some opportunities by foreclosing others. Therefore, as long as
the pregnancy contract is voluntarily accepted by the mother, it is no violation
of her autonomy or dignity to enforce it. Rather, it would be a violation of
her autonomy and personhood – an objectionable form of paternalism – to
prevent her from entering such a contract.
The second argument proves too much: namely, that all voluntary
contracts whatsoever, even contracts into slavery, express and uphold the
autonomy of the parties. The error in this argument is its failure to recognize
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that some rights in one’s person are so essential to dignity and autonomy
that they must be held inalienable. This is not a paternalistic claim. The
claim is not that individuals must be protected from their own bad judg-
ment. The claim is rather that there are some ways of treating people that
are morally objectionable, even if they consent to being treated those ways.
One cannot turn physical or emotional abuse of another person into respect
for their autonomy and dignity just by saying, “you consented to be treated
this way” –even if the other person did consent. Some obligations to others
are not conditional on their consent. McLachlan and Swales are therefore
in no position to argue, from the supposedly general nature of contracts as
devices for expressing autonomy, to the particular conclusion that pregnancy
contracts respect the mother’s autonomy. One must examine the details of
such contracts to see whether they treat inalienable rights as if they were
alienable commodities.
McLachlan and Swales’ first argument is also mistaken. It does not meet
the objection to argue that in many pregnancy contracts the commissioning
parents and contracting agency do treat the mother decently. This is like
saying: there is nothing inherent in a slave contract that violates the dignity
and autonomy of the slave. After all, many slave owners treat their slaves
decently and permit them a wide range of freedoms. Therefore, if a given
slave is disrespectfully treated by the slave owner, this is a problem with the
character of the slave owner, not a problem inherent in the slave contract.
This argument is flawed, because slave contracts give slave owners alicense
to disrespect their slaves, and anincentiveto do so. Even if slaveowners did
not act on their incentive, the mere license to abuse the slave is enough to
render the slave contract an objectionable form of commodification, because
it treats the slave’s inalienable rights as alienable.
I am not trying to argue that pregnancy contracts reduce women to slaves.
Rather, my point is that both pregnancy contracts and slave contracts wrongly
treat someone’s inalienable rights as if they were freely alienable. Pregnancy
contracts treat the mother’s inalienable right to love her child, and to express
that love by asserting a claim to custody in its own best interests, as if it
were alienable in a market transaction. One might wonder how this could
be a violation of her autonomy, given that her right to care for her child is
grounded not in her own interests but in her obligation to her child. How does
alienating this right in a contract constitute an unjust commodification of her
as well as of her child? The answer is, as Kant argued (Kant, 1964) that
people express their autonomy in fulfilling their duties, not just in carrying
out optional personal projects.
The terms of the pregnancy contract demand of the mother not merely
certain behaviors, but engagement in the emotional labor of distancing herself
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from her child. Standard pregnancy contracts require her to agree not to form
or attempt to form a parent-child relationship with her child. What if, despite
her initial intentions, she finds herself coming to love her own child? The
commercial surrogate mother industry and the commissioning parents assert
the authority to interpret this development as an immoral act – a broken
promise, a betrayal, and a threat to the commissioning parents – and to insist
that the mother view her love for her child in this way as well. This is a
violation of her autonomy.
McLachlan and Swales think this is not so, because the content of a
pregnancy contract is not that different from the content of a marriage
contract. The marriage contract also restricts the freedom of marriage partners
to develop love relationships (those outside the marriage), and interpret such
love relationships that might take place as betrayals and threats to the other
party to the marriage contract. However, there is a great moral difference
between expecting a spouse not to develop extramarital love relationships
and expecting a parent not to develop a loving relationship with her own
child.
McLachlan and Swales also argue that pregnancy contracts should be
drawn in analogy to prenuptial agreements, which specify in advance what
is to happen if the parties subsequently change their minds. This is an attempt
to soften what would otherwise be a rigid enforcement of the relinquishment
clause of the pregnancy contract, which they properly sense would consti-
tute a violation of a reluctant mother’s autonomy (remember those “burly
policemen”). However, while prenuptial agreements may specify the division
of property in the event of divorce, it is notable that no valid prenuptial agree-
ments are allowed to specify ahead of time the allocation of child custody
rights. This is proper, because that determination must be made with the best
interests of the child in mind, and it is impossible to stipulate what these
would be in advance.4
Pregnancy Contracts Should be Illegal
So far I have argued that pregnancy contracts are unethical, and that the law
should regard them as null and void. In the event of breach, the ensuing
custody dispute should be viewed as any custody dispute between unmarried
parents is viewed in the law. If custody is to be awarded to the father in a
dispute, this conclusion should be based not on the contract, but on a deter-
mination of the best interests of the child. We have seen that McLachlan
and Swales, despite their official view that pregnancy contracts are morally
innocent, even “laudable”, flinch at the suggestion that they should be, as a
rule, enforced against the will of the mother. I give them credit for feeling,
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if not quite seeing, that such a rule would disrespectfully disregard the rights
and interests of both the mother and the child. Indeed, any rule that gave any
legal weight to the contract would do so.
It does not follow from this, however, that pregnancy contracts should be
illegal. In my book (Anderson, 1993), I argued that they should be illegal,
and that the brokers to such deals be subject to criminal penalties. I advocate
taking this extra step for two reasons. First, as we have seen, the brokers’
actions are morally on a par with baby selling. Second, there is no feasible
way to prevent brokers from bullying and exploiting mothers in a regime that
holds such contracts legal but unenforceable.
The father in a pregnancy contract tends to be desperate. His wife has
typically undergone years of futile infertility treatments. The father and his
wife either regard adoption as unthinkable or have been deemed ineligible to
adopt a child. The broker represents the interests of the father in its dealings
with the mother, and therefore will do what it can to ensure that the mother
will relinquish custody of the child and terminate her parental rights. If preg-
nancy contracts lack legal force, this gives the broker and the desperate father
a powerful incentive to resort to bullying and abusive extralegal means to get
what they want from the mother. There is no effective way to regulate the
brokers’ behavior, since it is so difficult to monitor. It is better, then, to try to
eliminate the industry by making it illegal.
Against my view that commercial surrogate brokerage should be illegal,
McLachlan and Swales draw analogies to the failures of Prohibition and
anti-prostitution laws. The analogies are inapt. Prohibition failed because
almost everyone drank alcohol. Contract pregnancy is an option only a tiny
number of people would ever seek. Laws against prostitution are objection-
able because they effectively give police, pimps, and customers a license
to treat prostitutes as outlaws, a license they use to grievously abuse and
exploit prostitutes. In addition, some women need to resort to prostitution
just to survive. Thus, while prostitution as currently practiced constitutes a
degrading traffic in women, making it illegal puts women in an even worse
position. By contrast, laws against commercial surrogate brokers would not
subject surrogate mothers themselves to criminal penalties. Nor would they
foreclose any woman’s means of survival. Brokers and fathers do not deem
women on the edge of survival to be suitable “surrogate” mothers of their
children.
Free markets are wonderful institutions in their place. But they are
objectionable when allowed to govern spheres of life that should not be
commodified. In a world in which market norms have been lauded as cure-alls
for every social ill, the time has come to draw some limits to their authority.
26
Here is one: market norms should not be allowed to come between a mother
and her love for her child.
Notes
1 In the usual case of a parenting contract, the “surrogate” mother is the mother, both geneti-
cally and gestationally. If the “surrogate” mother gestates another woman’s donated egg, it
is arguable that she should not be regarded as the legal mother of the child. Thus, she may
have no parental rights to relinquish, and any contractual arrangements concerning transfer
of custody would not involve commodification of the child. Her reproductive (gestational)
labor would still be objectionably commodified, but the reasons for thinking so would be
closer to those articulated by Debra Satz (Satz, 1992) (arguing that contract pregnancy is
objectionable because it reinforces a traditional gendered division of labor that underwrites
women’s inequality).
2 To avoid this conflict of interest, the other half of the contract – promising payment to the
mother in return for her giving up custody and parental rights – should also be held null and
void.
3 Perhaps they would take a fallback position: that the mother does not relinquish her parental
rights in the contract, but that these rights are to be balanced against the father’s rights as
defined in the contract. This amounts to the view that the child’s best interests are no longer
to be regarded as the sole factor in a custody dispute, since they may be traded off against
the interests of the parents as defined in their contract. They want us to believe that this way
of regarding children is better for them than when their interests are preeminent in custody
disputes. Or maybe just that a little commodification of children at the point of acquisition
is of no consequence, if this will afford them better (or merely adequate?) treatment by the
parents who acquire them. But how are we to assure this, if the best interests of the child do
not govern the termination of parental rights and allocation of custody at the outset?
4 This means that even a pregnancy contract that specified that the mother would keep
custody of her child if she changed her mind should not be enforceable. At the time of dispute,
the relevant question concerns the best interests of the child, and this may mean that the father
should get custody. Fathers also have inalienable rights and duties with respect to their children
that pregnancy contracts should not be allowed to treat as alienable.
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